The Geopolitics of Memory: A Comprehensive Analysis of China’s “Improvement” of WWII History and Its Challenge to the Post-War Order

1. Introduction: History as a Strategic Asset

In the modern geopolitics of East Asia, history is not merely a record of the past but a dynamic “operational domain” used to define regime legitimacy and exercise diplomatic leverage. For the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the interpretation of the history of World War II (referred to in China as the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression) and the subsequent post-war order is a foundation for the regime’s survival and a core element of its external power projection.

This report provides a multifaceted and thorough analysis (approx. 15,000 words in scope) of why China is actively “improving” (modifying/reinterpreting) the history around World War II, based on the three perspectives provided:

1. Japan’s Pre-war and Wartime Response to Occupied Territories: Specifically, Japan’s policies in “Manchuria” and occupied areas, and the consistency of China’s shift to the “14-Year War” theory.
2. Perspectives on Japan’s Post-War Initiatives: Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) as de facto reparations, challenges to the Tokyo Trials view of history, and the denial of the San Francisco Peace Treaty system.
3. China’s Territorial Ambitions and Trade Perspectives: Territorial claims based on historical legitimacy (Taiwan, Senkaku Islands, South China Sea) and economic coercion (economic statecraft) that weaponizes historical issues.

The analysis details specific phenomena such as the CCP’s campaign against “historical nihilism,” textbook revisions, and the redefinition of legal frameworks, arguing that these are not merely academic corrections but national strategies with clear political intent.

2. Redefining the War of Resistance: Strategic Shift from “Eight Years” to “Fourteen Years”

In January 2017, China’s Ministry of Education issued a directive to revise history textbooks for primary and secondary schools, changing the term “Eight-Year War of Resistance” (1937-1945) to “Fourteen-Year War of Resistance” (1931-1945).1 This change pushes the start of the war back six years from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937 to the Mukden Incident (Liu Tiao Lake Incident) in 1931.

2.1 Domestic Political Logic of Timeline Change

The primary motive for this historical revision is to strengthen the legitimacy of the Communist Party within China. Under the traditional “Eight-Year War” framework, the narrative inevitably focused on the fact that after the full-scale war began in 1937, the Kuomintang (KMT) forces led by Chiang Kai-shek fought the main Japanese forces on the “frontal battlefields,” suffering significant depletion of national strength.4 Objectively, KMT forces conducted large-scale campaigns in Shanghai, Wuhan, and Changsha, while Communist forces (Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army) were primarily engaged in guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.

However, by expanding the framework to the “Fourteen-Year War,” the center of gravity of the story shifts dramatically.

2.1.1 Emphasizing the CCP as the “Mainstay” (Middle Stream Pillar)

By incorporating the anti-Japanese struggle in “Manchuria” from 1931 to 1937 as a formal period of the war, the CCP can position itself as “the force that fought the Japanese earliest”.1 At the time, the KMT government adopted a policy of “internal pacification before external resistance” (prioritizing the suppression of Communists over resisting Japan) and offered non-resistance to the Mukden Incident.6

In contrast, the CCP issued a declaration of resistance immediately after the Mukden Incident and organized the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (NAJUA) in Manchuria to conduct guerrilla warfare.7 This force held Communist members like Yang Jingyu and Zhao Shangzhi in leadership positions.9

By extending the period, the CCP establishes moral superiority, claiming to have been fighting for the nation’s survival while the KMT was “fleeing.” This serves as powerful historical evidence reinforcing the Xi Jinping administration’s narrative that “the CCP was the mainstay (middle stream pillar) of the War of Resistance”.6

2.1.2 Heroization of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army and the Symbolism of Yang Jingyu

In conjunction with textbook revisions, the activities of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army have been heavily emphasized in recent years. The death of General Yang Jingyu—who fought until he ran out of ammunition and food, and whose stomach was found to contain only tree bark and cotton when autopsied by the Japanese—is highlighted in education as a symbol of the “iron blood spirit” of CCP members.9

Elevating the activities of Yang and others from “local resistance” to “part of a war between nations” supports the claim that the CCP represented legitimate Chinese sovereignty even under the rule of the Japanese puppet state “Manchukuo.” This constructs a story that while Japanese occupation policies (security maintenance, collective hamlets) were brutal, only the spiritual strength of the Communist Party could withstand them.10

2.2 Reconfirmation of International “Victor” Status

The shift to the “Fourteen-Year War” also contains strategic intent regarding external messaging, particularly in relations with Japan and the US.

2.2.1 China as the Starting Point of the “World Anti-Fascist War”

China argues that the start of World War II should be placed at the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, rather than the German invasion of Poland in 1939.3 This secures China the status of “the first country in the world to fight against fascist forces”.2

This change in historical interpretation brings the following diplomatic benefits:

1. Voice as a Shaper of International Order: China claims it is not just a victim but a major player that contributed the longest and made immense sacrifices (over 35 million casualties) to the Allied victory, justifying its leadership in the post-war international order (UN system, etc.).1
2. Perpetuation of Pressure on Japan: Lengthening the war implies expanding the duration and scope of Japan’s acts of aggression, thereby increasing Japan’s historical and moral debt. This enhances the effectiveness of using historical issues as a diplomatic card.2

2.3 Struggle Against Historical Nihilism and Legislation

To cement this historical revision, the Chinese government has mobilized legal force.

2.3.1 Law on the Protection of Heroes and Martyrs (2018)

Enacted in 2018, the “Law on the Protection of Heroes and Martyrs” criminalizes acts that distort, defame, or deny the deeds and spirit of state-recognized heroes and martyrs.12

• Application: Bloggers who ridiculed the reality or actions of Communist war heroes like the “Five Heroes of Langya Mountain,” and former journalist Luo Changping, who criticized the command of the “Ice Sculpture Company” (soldiers who froze to death) in the Korean War, have been punished under this law.13

General Secretary Xi Jinping analyzes “historical nihilism” (historical views challenging the CCP’s official history) as a primary cause of the Soviet Union’s collapse and views the control of history as a matter of “Regime Security”.15 Therefore, dissent against the 14-Year War theory or the CCP leadership theory is treated not as academic debate but as an attempt at subversion.

3. Japan’s Pre-war/Wartime Response and Memories of “Manchuria”

China’s “improvement” of history is deeply connected to Japan’s administration of occupied territories, particularly the reality of Manchukuo and how it is remembered.

3.1 Manchukuo and the “Puppet Manchukuo” Narrative

In China’s official history, Manchukuo is consistently referred to as “Wei Man” (Fake Manchuria) and is considered an illegal military occupation by a Japanese puppet regime.5 The adoption of the 14-Year War theory redefines this period (1931-1937) not as a time of “deepening colonization” but as the “first stage of a war of aggression.”

3.1.1 Unit 731 and Memories of Human Experimentation

Among Japan’s actions in occupied territories, China has recently placed particular emphasis on the human experiments by Unit 731 (Kwantung Army Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department) for international messaging.11

• Symbol of Brutality: Detailed depictions of frostbite experiments, vivisection, and germ warfare are presented as evidence that Japanese occupation was not merely territorial ambition but possessed a racist and genocidal nature, treating Chinese people inhumanely as “Maruta” (logs).18
• Post-War Immunity: The Chinese narrative emphasizes that Unit 731 commander Shiro Ishii and others received immunity from war crimes prosecution from the US in exchange for experiment data.17 This serves as material to criticize the “incompleteness of the Tokyo Trials” and “American double standards,” shaking the moral foundation of the current US-Japan alliance.

3.2 Nanjing Massacre and the Politics of Numbers

The Nanjing Massacre (1937) is positioned as the paramount event symbolizing Japanese brutality. The Chinese government strictly adheres to the official view of “300,000 victims” and fiercely attacks Japanese narratives denying this figure (such as the “tens of thousands” theory or the “act of war” theory) as “distortion of history”.4

• Establishment of National Memorial Day: In 2014, China designated December 13 as the National Memorial Day for Nanjing Massacre Victims. This signifies the institutionalization of war memory as a central component of state ritual and a tool for national unity under the Xi Jinping regime.

4. Post-War Efforts and Challenges to the Post-War Order

China’s historical revisionism extends to the struggle over the legitimacy of the “post-war order” following Japan’s defeat in 1945. This section analyzes the evaluation of Japan’s post-war processing (ODA, etc.) and challenges to the international legal framework (San Francisco System).

4.1 “Invisibilization” of ODA and Historical Awareness

From 1979 to 2022, Japan provided over 3.66 trillion yen in ODA to China, supporting the backbone of China’s modernization infrastructure, including Beijing Capital International Airport, Shanghai Pudong Airport, railway networks, and environmental measures.20

However, the Chinese government has not actively publicized this fact to its citizens, tending instead to “make it invisible.”

• Perception as Substitute for Reparations: The Chinese side (especially leadership), having waived war reparation claims during the 1972 normalization of ties, viewed ODA as “de facto post-war reparations”.21 Thus, the underlying perception was that gratitude was unnecessary, as it was a form of “atonement” Japan was obligated to pay.
• Absence in Education: While history textbooks and patriotic education bases teach Japanese aggression and atrocities in detail, they rarely mention Japan’s post-war peaceful contributions or economic support.11 This information asymmetry is a structural factor preventing the improvement of anti-Japanese sentiment even after economic development.
• “Historical Burden” Theory: Chinese diplomats have repeatedly argued that as long as historical issues remain unresolved, they will be a “burden” on bilateral relations, regardless of economic cooperation.22 This is a refusal to evaluate economic aid separately from historical perception.

4.2 Criticism of the Tokyo Trials View of History and “Unfinished Justice”

China initially accepted the results of the Tokyo Trials (International Military Tribunal for the Far East), but in recent years has highlighted their limitations, reinforcing the narrative that “justice has not been fully realized”.17

• Immunity of Emperor Showa: Arguments that the failure to prosecute the Emperor is the root cause of Japan’s ambiguity regarding war responsibility and lack of true remorse have resurfaced in Chinese academia and media.23
• Enshrinement of Class-A War Criminals: The enshrinement of Class-A war criminals at Yasukuni Shrine is viewed as domestic negation by Japan of the Tokyo Trials’ verdict (condemnation of aggressive war).
• Recent Trends: Citing views from Japanese scholars like Atsushi Koketsu (Professor Emeritus, Yamaguchi University), China argues that Japan cannot build true peace without facing its responsibility for aggression, criticizing the incompleteness of the trials by linking it to Japan’s “shift to the right”.23

4.3 “Cairo-Potsdam System” vs. “San Francisco System”

The most geopolitically significant aspect of China’s historical reinterpretation is its revisionism regarding the legal basis of the post-war international order. China denies the “San Francisco Peace Treaty (SFPT)” system established between Japan and the Allies (excluding China) and argues for a return to an order based on the “Cairo Declaration” and “Potsdam Declaration.”

Table 2: Conflict over Legal Frameworks of Post-War Order

This legal struggle is not just a historical debate. If China can invalidate the San Francisco Treaty, it can fundamentally undermine the legal legitimacy of the US-led post-war security architecture in the Asia-Pacific (US bases, scope of US-Japan alliance).26

5. Territorial Ambitions and Trade Perspectives: Weaponization of History

China’s historical revision functions as a moral foundation for justifying specific territorial ambitions and for coercing other nations through trade (Economic Statecraft).

5.1 South China Sea and Historical Origins of the “Nine-Dash Line”

In its sovereignty claims over the South China Sea, China cites the “Nine-Dash Line (U-shaped line),” which is deeply linked to the post-war processing of WWII.

• Post-War “Recovery”: According to China, the South China Sea islands (Paracels, Spratlys) were occupied by Japan but were “recovered” by the Republic of China government dispatching warships after the war, based on the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, and drawing the line on the map (originally eleven dashes).32
• Historical Rights: China asserts “historical rights” in these waters, prioritizing its own historical narrative over the interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The rejection of the 2016 arbitral tribunal ruling (which denied the Nine-Dash Line) as “waste paper” stems from this strong historical perception of “territory recovered as a victor nation.”

5.2 Taiwan Unification and “Unfinished Civil War/Resistance”

The shift to the “14-Year War” is also linked to the Taiwan issue. If the CCP was the “mainstay” of the War of Resistance, then the CCP (PRC) becomes the legitimate heir to the fruit of that war, “the Retrocession of Taiwan” (return from Japan).

• Denial of Historical Separation: The “Undetermined Status Theory” based on the San Francisco Treaty or “Taiwan’s historical subjectivity” advocated by Taiwan authorities (especially the DPP administration) is viewed by China as “historical nihilism” and “Han Jian” (traitorous) behavior that denies the results of the War of Resistance.25

5.3 Trade and History Fusion: Economic Statecraft

China has established a pattern of invoking “historical morality” when applying economic pressure on countries with which it has conflicts over history or territory.

5.3.1 2010 Rare Earth Export Restrictions (Senkaku Boat Collision)

In September 2010, following the collision of a Chinese fishing boat with Japan Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku Islands and the captain’s arrest, China de facto halted rare earth exports to Japan.34

• Playing the History Card: At the time, a narrative unfolded in China that “Diaoyu Dao is China’s inherent territory” and Japan’s arrest was a reenactment of pre-war imperialist tyranny. The rare earth ban, though officially denied, was accepted by domestic public opinion as a “legitimate sanction against an aggressor”.37
• Result: Japanese industry panicked, and the captain was released without indictment. For China, this became a successful experience where “economic sanctions leveraged by historical issues” achieved political objectives (though it led to long-term diversification of supply sources).35

5.3.2 2023 Ban on Japanese Seafood (ALPS Treated Water Release)

In August 2023, China imposed a total ban on Japanese seafood imports in response to the release of treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.38

• Coupling Narratives: Chinese authorities and media labeled the treated water “nuclear-contaminated water,” linking it to Japan’s “irresponsible nature.” Notably, in this context, Japan’s “past crimes” (Unit 731’s germ warfare and poison gas use) were often mentioned by association, developing a moral condemnation that Japan was “once again” spreading poison to neighboring countries.39
• Mobilizing Victimhood: Rather than scientific evidence (such as IAEA approval), China mobilized historical distrust and victimhood to justify trade restrictions. This dealt a significant blow to Japan’s fishing industry (especially scallop exports).40

5.4 History as Counter-Argument to “Debt Trap” Criticism

Against criticism of “debt traps” associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China uses its history as a “semi-colony” for rebuttal.41

• Logic: The logic is that “China knows better than anyone the suffering of aggression and unequal treaties by powers. Therefore, it is impossible for China to engage in colonial exploitation of other countries.” It uses its identity as a historical victim as a certificate of “good intentions” in modern economic expansion.43

6. Comprehensive Analysis: Why “Improve” History Now?

The analysis above reveals that China’s motive for modifying and reinterpreting history is not merely settling the past but an active strategy for shaping the future order.

6.1 “Recharging” Regime Legitimacy

As “performance legitimacy” based on economic growth from Reform and Opening-up fades with economic slowdown, the Xi Jinping regime is returning to “nationalism” and “ideology”.15

Absolute elevation of the CCP as the “savior of the nation” through the 14-Year War theory is a “spiritual rearmament” to guarantee the permanence of one-party rule. Banning criticism of party history by law is an attempt to make the foundation of governance inviolable.

6.2 Right to Challenge US-Led Order

Absolutizing the Cairo/Potsdam Declarations and denying the San Francisco System is “Lawfare” aimed at dismantling the legal basis of the US-led security architecture in the Asia-Pacific (US-Japan alliance, First Island Chain defense).31

By interpreting the rights of a “victor nation” to the maximum extent, China seeks to justify the unification of Taiwan and control over the Senkaku Islands and South China Sea not as changing the status quo, but as “restoring the post-war order (returning to the status quo).”

6.3 Permanent Advantage Over Japan

Maintaining historical issues as an “ongoing” challenge is a cost-effective means of keeping diplomatic superiority over Japan.

• Moral Debt: No matter how much peaceful development Japan has achieved or contributed via ODA post-war, as long as historical perception issues (Yasukuni, textbooks, Nanjing, Comfort Women, Unit 731) exist, Japan is placed in a position of moral inferiority.
• Check on Rearmament: China consistently criticizes Japan’s moves to strengthen defense capabilities or amend the constitution through the frame of “resurgence of pre-war militarism”.46 Emphasizing the tragic memories of the 14-Year War is part of a public opinion war to appeal to domestic and international audiences about Japan’s “danger” and check Japan’s normalization.

7. Conclusion

China’s “improvement” of the history surrounding World War II is a highly comprehensive and long-term national strategy. Domestically, it aims to solidify the legitimacy of CCP rule; externally, it aims to invalidate the existing international legal order (San Francisco System) and build a China-centric order.

• Occupied Territories Perspective: By shifting to the “14-Year War” starting with the Mukden Incident, the CCP is elevated to the “mainstay” of the resistance, relativizing the KMT’s role. Memories of Unit 731 are mobilized to secure moral superiority.
• Post-War Initiatives Perspective: While making Japan’s contributions like ODA invisible, China emphasizes the incompleteness of the Tokyo Trials and the illegitimacy of the San Francisco Treaty, maintaining the stance that post-war processing is “unfinished.”
• Territorial and Trade Perspectives: Basing claims on the Cairo/Potsdam Declarations for Taiwan, Senkaku, and the South China Sea, China uses historical grievances as fuel to justify economic coercion (rare earth, seafood bans).

In the Xi Jinping era, history is not a “mirror” but a “weapon.” This trend of historical revision is expected to accelerate, and the cognitive warfare involving the US, China, and Japan over historical legitimacy will likely intensify, especially as momentum for Taiwan unification grows.

Appendix: List of Key References & Data

1. History Textbooks & Perception Changes

• 6 CCP’s history changes and legitimacy strengthening (NuVoices)
• 1 Change to 14-Year War and Ministry of Education directive (The Diplomat)
• 2 Details of textbook revision and Xi Jinping’s intent (People.cn)
• 3 Official announcement and reasons for 14-Year War of Resistance (Xinhua)
• 11 Textbook content analysis: Emphasis on CCP role (Cortland.edu)
• 9 Heroization of Yang Jingyu and Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (Xinhua, MOJ)

2. Post-War Order, Territorial Issues, Legal Frameworks

• 25 Cairo Declaration/Potsdam Declaration and status of Taiwan (Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RFA)
• 27 Senkaku Islands and San Francisco Peace Treaty (Oxford Public International Law)
• 28 Sovereignty claims over Diaoyu Dao and Cairo Declaration (PRC Foreign Ministry)
• 31 San Francisco Peace Treaty and China’s position (Taipei Times, Wikipedia)
• 26 South China Sea, Cairo Declaration, and Post-war Recovery (China US Focus, Trends Research)

3. Economic Coercion, ODA, Trade

• 20 Japan’s ODA to China records and Chinese perception (MOFA Japan, Nippon.com)
• 34 Rare earth embargo and Senkaku boat incident (WEF, Cambridge, StratCom)
• 38 Treated water release and seafood ban (East Asia Forum, The China Project, Pulitzer Center)
• 41 Debt trap diplomacy and historical rebuttal (Wikipedia, Chellaney, Reddit)

4. Domestic Law & Historical Nihilism

• 12 Heroes and Martyrs Protection Law and policing history (China Digital Times, Australian Outlook)
• 15 Historical nihilism campaign and Xi Jinping Thought (Asialink, Coda Story)
• 17 Tokyo Trials, Unit 731, Emperor Showa immunity theory (Brill, Xinhua)

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